In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.3 (2000) 497-499 [Access article in PDF] Thomas Schmitz. Bildung und Macht: zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zweiten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit. Munich: Beck, 1997. 270 pp. Paper, DM 98. (Zetemata, 97) This book, which originated as a Habilitationsschrift, offers an intelligent and energetic analysis of the Second Sophistic from a sociological perspective informed by the work of Pierre Bourdieu. This (...) is not Bourdieu the Algerian sociologist of the 1960s, nor even Bourdieu the polemical critic of social anthropology of the 1970s, but the Bourdieu of the 1970s and 1980s who applied his theories of practice and symbolic capital to the analysis of language and education in such works as Homo Academicus (Paris 1984) and Ce que parler veut dire: l'économie des échanges linguistiques (Paris 1982).Schmitz is interested in the way the elites of Greek cities used education to legitimate their ruling position (chapter 2.2, "Bildung als Legitimation zur Herrschaft"). The social domination of an elite, where not based on brute force, may be presented by that elite, both to those they dominate and to themselves, as the "natural" result of certain forms of superiority. The hallmark of elite superiority in the Greek cities of the Empire was paideia. This situation may explain the general prevalence of rhetorical training among elite families, but not why some people from these families would become sophists. Schmitz demonstrates [End Page 497] correctly that performing as a sophist did not in itself procure social advancement (chapter 2.3). Instead he sees the ruling class as delegating the legitimation of its collective power to certain of its members, so that the sophists in effect performed publicly as pars pro toto (64-66). How exactly the invisible hand of class delegation made itself felt in individual life choices would require some psychological speculation, which Schmitz does not attempt here. Possibly sophists evolved from child prodigies whose early success in outperforming their peers instilled a lifelong appetite for victorious competition.Mastery of the arbitrary complexities of atticizing paideia set one apart from the underclass (chapter 3) but could also be used to set oneself apart from one's peers. Schmitz sees striving for distinction as a constant in imperial society (chapter 4) and makes good use of the posthumous vaunts of funerary inscriptions to show that for these aristocrats paideia was the medium of competition par excellence (chapter 5.1). He stresses the parallel between paideia and euergetism (65-66, 95-96, 100ff., 219-20), a form of competitive political communication that validated the ascendancy not only of the individual liturgist but also the class to which he belonged. He describes the cornucopia of opportunities for public competition that characterized imperial society (from children's encomium contests at the Pythian Games to learned symposia) but concludes that because it structured competitive impulses and enhanced participants' sense of belonging, paideia, like euergetistic competition, operated in imperial society as a centripetal as well as centrifugal force (chapter 4.5).Schmitz sees the opsimathes as a sort of bogeyman whose pedantry, laboriously acquired and gauchely displayed, educated aristocrats imagined to contrast with their own paideia, the product of an inborn superiority. Indeed in chapter 5 he uses Bourdieu to pinpoint one of the reasons that participants and educated observers put such stress on extemporaneous performance: "il leur suffit d'être ce qu'ils sont pour être ce qu'il faut être, c'est-à-dire naturellement distingués de ceux qui ne peuvent pas faire l'économie de la recherche de la distinction" (158). As Schmitz himself puts it, in an extemporaneous performance, an aristocratic sophist "zeigte er nicht, was er erlernt hatte und was er wusste, sondern was er war." Improvisation functioned as synecdoche for aristocratic supremacy.What sophists have to say about the size of the crowds they enthralled should be taken with a grain of salt. In chapter 6 Schmitz is perhaps a bit too credulous in this regard, but he rightly stresses the artful way in which... (shrink)

Principles and the context, by J. C. Bennett.--Love monism, by J. M. Gustafson.--Responsibility in freedom, by E. C. Gardner.--The new morality, by G. Fackre.--When love becomes excarnate, by H. L. Smith.--Situational morality, by R. W. Gleason.--The nature of heresy, by G. Kennedy.--Situation ethics under fire, by J. Fletcher.

A. ScT 803–21 are a notorious crux, which has received very varied treatment from editors without any clear solution of the problem emerging.A widely favoured version follows that of Weil, and disposes the lines as follows: 803–4 –6–7 or )–8–9–io )–ll )–21–I2 … 19– [20]. We may be able to concede the arbitrary transpositions of 805 and 821, since it is likely enough that the text is substantially disordered; more serious, however, are the inherent weaknesses in Weil's rearrangement.

Kant’s distinction between appearance and thing in itself is one of the essential doctrines of his critical philosophy. He used it to attempt a solution of the problem posed by the antinomies. He based his theory of human free will on it. He employed it in his view that certain a priori conditions make experience in the sense of empirical knowledge possible. Indeed, there is scarcely an aspect of Kant’s philosophy that does not, directly or indirectly, depend on some use (...) of this distinction. (shrink)